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Chapter 7
Effects of Formalisation of the Shadow
Economy
Milojko Arsic´ and Gorana Krstic´
7.1 Fiscal Implications of Formalisation of Shadow
Economy
7.1.1 Estimate of Possible Fiscal Effects with Respect to VAT
As tax evasion is by far the largest component of the VAT gap, the question that
needs to be asked is to what extent VAT revenue could be increased by ensuring
better tax collection over the medium and the long term, all other considerations
being equal.1 Over the medium term a realistic aim for Serbia would be to reduce
the VAT gap to the average level seen in the five new Central European EUmember
states before their EU accession. This means that in the next several years a realistic
aim would be to cut the VAT gap from its current level of 21 % to 18–19 %, as
experienced by Central European EU member states. Cutting the VAT gap by 2–3
percentage points would result in an increase in the Serbian budget revenues of
between 0.2 and 0.5 % of GDP. In the long run, say within 10 years, Serbia could
aim to reduce the VAT gap to the EU average of 13.5 %. Cutting the VAT gap to
this level, all other conditions being equal, would increase budget revenue by 1 % of
GDP. Hypothetically, if Serbia’s VAT gap were reduced to the level seen by the
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1 It is important to bear in mind that other factors, such as a re-orientation of the economy towards
exports (not subject to VAT) and greater investment (subject to lower VAT rates), will have an
impact on the reduction of both hypothetical and actual VAT revenue. In this context any estimate
of additional revenues due to a reduction in the VAT gap should be treated as a hypothetical
estimate, all other conditions being equal, rather than as a realistic one. Closing the VAT gap is
therefore a necessary precondition for preventing, or at least reducing, any future decline in the
ratio of VAT revenue to GDP.
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five most efficient EU members (Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Luxembourg, and
France), where it stands at a mere 5 %, the additional revenue would be 2 %
of GDP.
All of the above estimates were made using current VAT rates as of 2011; we
therefore ought to determine the effect on these estimates of the increase in the
general VAT rate from 18 to 20 % that took effect in late 2012. The rise in the
general tax rate by 2 percentage points, as well as other changes to the VAT system,
will result in an increase in the potential VAT revenues of some RSD 33 billion at
current prices, which equals about 1 % of GDP. However, given the existing tax gap
(i.e. if the shadow economy remains unchanged), actual VAT revenues will
increase by about RSD 25 billion, or about 0.8 % of GDP (Fiscal Council 2012).2
7.1.2 Estimate of Possible Fiscal Effects with Respect
to Personal Income Tax and Social Contributions
Although the overall personal income tax and social contributions gap is relatively
significant, as we have seen in Chap. 5, potential additional public revenues that
could be generated through the efficient implementation of measures for reducing
the shadow economy are far lower. Even with the efficient use of well-designed
measures to combat the shadow economy, and given an effective institutional
framework, the shadow economy cannot be reduced to zero—as is borne out by
the fact that it is not insignificant even in the most developed countries. According
to 2011 estimates the total extent of the shadow economy in EU countries is 19.7 %
of GDP (Schneider 2011). Although separate estimates of the shadow economy in
household income and consumption are not provided, theoretical and empirical
studies have shown that the extent of the shadow economy is greater in income than
in consumption. We can accordingly assume that the shadow economy in house-
hold income is more widespread than the EU average. Starting from the assumption
that the estimated level of the shadow economy in household income in Serbia is
24.4 % of GDP, measures aimed at tackling the shadow economy could reduce this
level by some 10–15 %, with a similar reduction in the relevant tax gap. The
government would then see an increase of at most 0.6–0.9 % of GDP in income
tax and social contributions revenue (0.6 % of GDP in the medium term and slightly
more in the long run, assuming systemic measures are implemented consistently).
Taking into account VAT, income tax, and social contributions, reducing the
shadow economy to the level present in other Central and Eastern European
countries—an outcome that can be achieved in a relatively short span of time
(1–3 years), assuming the adoption and consistent implementation of systemic
2 These estimates differ from those made by the Fiscal Council because the impact on liquidity of
the shift to VAT payment upon collection of accounts receivable for small and medium-sized
businesses has been ignored, as this is a short-term effect.
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measures—could result in an increase in public revenue of between 0.8 and 1.1 %
of GDP (Table 7.1). Reducing the shadow economy to the EU average would take
longer (between 7 and 10 years) and require not only institutional measures, but
also other structural changes to the Serbian economic system. It could, however,
ensure additional public revenue of up to 1.9 % of GDP.
In interpreting the above estimates we must bear in mind that they reflect only
the isolated impact of the formalisation of the shadow economy, and not the impact
of other factors on the collection of tax revenue. In this sense the estimates
presented in Table 7.1 are not a forecast of changes in tax revenue in relation to
GDP. Other factors that will affect tax collection include long-term macroeconomic
trends such as movements in domestic demand and GDP and changes to the
employment rate. Thus, when estimating actual tax revenues, other factors need
to be taken into account in addition to the possible formalisation of the shadow
economy. The reduction in the difference between domestic demand and GDP,
which is necessary to avoid a balance of payments crisis, will cause a substantial
drop in VAT revenue in relation to GDP. A 5 percentage point drop in the ratio of
domestic demand to GDP would cause a corresponding fall in VAT revenue of
about 1 % of GDP. In this context, tackling the shadow economy can be interpreted
as a necessary activity to prevent a drop in VAT revenue in relation to GDP, rather
than as a possible source of additional tax revenue. In other words, if the shadow
economy is not formalised VAT revenue will decline by about 1 percentage point in
relation to GDP over the coming several years. Similarly, movements in the actual
levels of tax and social contribution revenues in relation to GDP will be affected by
changes in the employment rate. The number of employed might decline in 2013,
which could, all other things being equal, bring a drop in social contributions and
income tax revenue. However, employment in Serbia could increase in the medium
and the long term, which would generate additional income tax and social contri-
butions revenue.
7.2 Effects of Formalising the Shadow Economy
on Economic Growth
The preceding section estimated the possible fiscal effects given certain assump-
tions of a possible reduction in the shadow economy. This section will attempt to
consider how formalising the shadow economy can affect economic growth. This
Table 7.1 Estimate of the fiscal effects of formalising the informal economy in Serbia (in % of
GDP)
Short and medium term (1–3 years) Long term (7–10 years)
VAT 0.2–0.5 1.0
Income tax and contributions 0.6 0.9
Total 0.8–1.1 1.9
Source: Own calculations
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question is far more difficult to answer, as although there is a large body of
empirical research on the impact of the shadow economy on economic growth,
there are still no unequivocal empirical and theoretical findings (Schneider and
Enste 2000). The basic question is this: Is the shadow economy, from an economic
point of view, a positive phenomenon; in other words, does it make a positive
contribution to economic growth? The answer to this question will result in two
possible avenues of approach for government policy on the shadow economy:
tolerance or active suppression.
We can generally distinguish between three situations:
• Shadow and formal economies are substitutes for one another: any increase in
the shadow economy leads to a reduction in the volume of the formal economy;
• The volume of the formal economy is a given (i.e., fixed): the shadow economy
increases the total economic activity of a country; and
• The shadow economy contributes to the growth of the formal sector: its effect is
multiplicative.
The first view is the conventional one, based on a simple neoclassical model, that
the total volume of economic activity in a country is a given, based on the
assumption of full factor employment, so that the shadow economy may grow
only at the expense of economic activity in the formal sector. According to this
position, an entity chooses whether to take part in the shadow or the formal
economy; not doing business (being unemployed) is not an option. In this case
total GDP will even decrease, as operating efficiency is lower in the shadow than in
the formal economy (less capital-intensive technologies, greater uncertainty, poorer
protection of owners’ rights, etc.). Loayza (1996) showed how, under certain
conditions and using the example of Latin American countries, excessive tax
burden and over-regulation encourage the growth of the informal sector, which
has a negative impact on the pace of overall economic growth.
In the second case, given an unfavourable institutional environment, the volume
of activity in the formal economy may be a given; i.e., adverse circumstances may
preclude full-factor employment in this sector. For example, prohibitive laws, poor
economic policies, sanctions, or wars may constrain growth, as was the case with
Serbia in the 1990s. In this situation growth in the shadow economy does not affect
the formal sector but rather leads to an increase in the total economic activity.
Finally, in the third case, the shadow economy can have a positive impact on
economic activity in the formal sector through the interaction of the two sectors.
According to empirical research carried out by Schneider (1999), two-thirds of
income earned in the shadow economy in Germany and Austria is spent on
consumption in the formal economy (where value-added tax is payable), thus
boosting formal sector growth. The UK also saw a similar stimulating effect of
the informal economy on consumption in the formal sector (Bhattacharyya 1999).
An answer to the question of whether the shadow economy is useful or not and
how it affects economic growth can be found by using econometric models which
will be presented below. However, in real life various models and factors can act
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together, usually in opposing directions, and have different impacts on the final
result.
It can be posited that any major reduction in the shadow economy leads to a
major increase in tax revenue, which leads to more and better public goods and
services, which in turn boosts economic growth. This hypothesis was empirically
confirmed by, among others, Loayza (1996), whose research covered Latin
America. He established that any growth in the relative volume of the shadow
economy (in percent of GDP) contributes to a reduction in the growth of official
GDP in countries where (a) the statutory tax burden is greater than the optimum and
where (b) enforcement of compliance is too weak. This negative impact on GDP
can be explained by (a) reduced availability of public services in the formal sector
and (b) lower efficiency of the use of existing public services. The foundations of
this model have been criticised (Asea 1996), while the assumption that the shadow
economy hurts economic growth has failed to find widespread acceptance.
In the case of transition countries, Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) estimated
that the shadow economy has cushioned the drop in registered GDP, particularly in
countries that faced major declines in their GDP levels. Over half of the decline in
registered GDP carried over into the drop in overall economic activity, while the
other half was absorbed by the growing shadow economy. Using Ordinary Least
Squares regression, they concluded that the share of the shadow economy in overall
GDP increased by nearly 4 % for each 10 % of cumulative decline in
registered GDP.
Eilat and Zinnes (2000) came to a very important conclusion applicable to
transition economies, showing that there is an inertia effect in the creation of the
shadow economy, as well as a hysteresis effect in its destruction. If overall
economic activity is on the decline, a drop in GDP of one dollar is linked to an
increase in the shadow economy by 31 cents, meaning that the shadow economy
cushions the fall of registered GDP. On the other hand, if overall economic activity
is on the increase, a one-dollar rise in GDP leads to a reduction of just 25 cents in
the shadow economy. These findings indicate that caution is necessary when
estimating the effects of formalising the shadow economy on economic growth.
According to Schneider (2004), the shadow economy hurts economic growth in
developing countries while having a positive effect on economic growth in devel-
oped countries. The results of this econometric analysis, which covered 21 OECD
member states and 89 developing and transition countries, show that in developed
economies an increase in the shadow economy of 1 percentage point of GDP leads
to an increase in registered GDP of 7.7 %. On the other hand, in developing
countries 1-percentage-point growth in the shadow economy leads to a 4.9 %
drop in registered GDP, all other model variables being equal (openness of the
economy, inflation, government spending, capital accumulation rate, population).
One explanation for these results is that growth in the shadow economy in devel-
oped countries may stimulate the formal economy by generating additional income
that boosts formal-sector consumption. On the other hand, in developing countries a
greater volume of the shadow economy leads to a substantial erosion of the tax
base, which results in lower availability of public infrastructure and basic public
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services (such as an efficient legal system), in turn causing lower economic growth.
We believe that both of these explanations can be relevant to developing and
developed countries, but their final effect on economic growth depends on which
group of factors dominates.
However, a study carried out by USAID (2005) shows that there is no correlation
between the GDP growth rate and the shadow economy, and concludes that no
empirical confirmation can be found of the hypothesis that a reduction in the
shadow economy automatically leads to economic growth, and vice versa.
Although countries with higher GDP per capita have smaller shadow economies,
it cannot be determined whether formalisation is the cause or consequence of the
higher level of development. The authors also state that the available series of data
on changes to the shadow economy are not long enough to confirm or deny the
assumption that countries with high rates of economic growth are able to reduce
their shadow economy levels faster than those with lower growth rates. When
viewed from a theoretical standpoint the shadow economy limits business growth,
as it denies companies access to critical services and the opportunity to separate
their business and personal assets, which increases risk and constrains growth.
Serbia’s experience over a lengthy period of time shows the predominance of
distorting and negative effects of the shadow economy on balanced economic
growth, particularly in times of economic crisis. In the crisis conditions that Serbia
has faced since 2008 the shadow economy has become part of a vicious circle,
where one consequence of recession is flight from the formal to the shadow
economy, thus reducing tax revenue and thereby the availability of public services
and increasing the fiscal deficit. The growing deficit must then be compensated for
by greater tax rates, which drive companies and workers into the shadow economy
or out of the economy altogether. This downward spiral keeps repeating itself,
always at a lower level of GDP and employment. The state receives ever-lower
amounts of money to pursue appropriate development policies and finance public
services, leading to poorer public services and the continuation of the vicious circle
where companies are increasingly less ready to pay taxes. Government bodies are
thus faced with the task of adjusting how institutions operate and calibrating
economic policies so that the reduction in the shadow economy is accomplished
by shifting business from the informal to the formal sector, and so that there is
neither a decline in activity nor a drop in GDP.
Results of the study conducted using the MIMIC method in Serbia and the other
10 Central and Eastern European countries shown in Chap. 5 indicate that the
impact of the shadow economy on official GDP is statistically highly significant,
and has the expected negative sign. Depending on the model used, the value of the
GDP per capita coefficient varies between 0.60 and 0.70, meaning that if GDP
per capita declines by 1 percentage point, the shadow economy will grow by
between 0.6 and 0.7 percentage points. In other words, if GDP declines in the
future the shadow economy will grow as business entities attempt to off-set the
limited opportunities for doing business in the formal sector by becoming active in
the shadow economy.
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